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Abstract 
 
  In this paper we employ data from the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being 
Study in order to estimate a model of underground labor supply developed by Lemieux et 
al. (1994).  We focus specifically on the underground labor supply of unmarried fathers, a 
group that is likely to have significant involvement in the underground economy.  We 
also extend the empirical analysis of Lemieux et al. by taking into account exogenous 
state and local variation in marginal tax rates, as well as sociodemographic variables 
related to the likelihood of participation in the underground. 
  In accordance with expectations, we find that a significant proportion of 
unmarried fathers report participation in the underground.  However, although the 
theoretical model predicts a positive relationship between the tax rate and underground 
hours of work (under certain conditions), we find that the effect of the tax rate on hours is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero, even after including exogenous variation in tax 
rates.  We also fail to find a positive and statistically significant effect of the tax rate on 
participation in the underground.   Within the context of the model, these results have 
specific implications for the magnitudes of the probability of detection and the penalty on 
evaded tax.  Therefore, we conclude that additional empirical information is needed 
regarding these parameters.  Future research might also employ other datasets in the 
estimation of the theoretical model outlined by Lemieux et al., as well as investigate the 
applicability of other models of underground labor supply.   This paper considers whether marginal tax rates influence the likelihood that 
unmarried fathers participate in the underground economy.  Although it does not directly 
consider the effect of the imposition of child support payments, a primary motivation for 
examining the effect of marginal tax rates stems from the possibility that such payments 
may cause unmarried fathers to face high implicit tax rates on their earnings.
1  To the 
extent these tax rates drive fathers underground, it may be harder for state authorities to 
obtain child support payments.  In this way, enforcement of child support may be 
counter-productive.  In addition, fathers who increase their hours of work in the 
underground may be less likely to build human capital that is useful in the mainstream 
economy, thus further compromising their ability to contribute to the material well-being 
of their children.   
  Theoretical work on tax evasion has shown that, consistent with intuition, an 
individual may be induced, under certain circumstances, to work in the underground 
sector in order to reduce his or her tax burden (Sandmo 1981; Cowell 1985; Kesselman 
1989).  In the models employed in these analyses, individuals must simultaneously decide 
how many hours to supply to the labor market, and how to allocate those hours between 
the regular and underground sectors.  However, because these models must account for 
decisions across two margins (i.e. the labor-leisure choice, and the regular-underground 
sector choice), they have not resulted in unambiguous predictions concerning the effect 
of higher marginal tax rates on hours of work in the underground sector.  Thus, 
                                                           
1 Existing analyses of the effects of child support enforcement on the labor market behavior of non-
custodial fathers treat the imposition of child support orders as analogous to the imposition of taxes on 
wage income (Klawitter, 1994; Freeman and Waldfogel, 1995).  However, these studies have focused on 
the potential effects of child support enforcement on the labor force participation and total earnings of non-
custodial fathers, without discerning whether earnings arise from the regular sector, the underground sector, 
or both.   2
researchers interested in tax evasion have begun to look to empirical work to clarify this 
effect. 
  To date there have been few empirical studies of the effects of income taxes on 
participation in the underground economy, in part because of the difficulty of collecting 
information on the number of hours worked by individuals who participate in the 
underground economy.  However, two previous studies suggest that higher marginal tax 
rates may encourage greater participation in the underground economy among the general 
population.  Specifically, Lacroix and Fortin (1992) utilized data from a survey of 
individuals in Quebec City, Canada, which was designed for the express purpose of 
eliciting information on the extent of work in the underground sector.  A descriptive 
analysis of the data revealed that participation in the underground economy, as well as 
hours of work conditional on participation, were inversely related to disposable income.  
Furthermore, among individuals employed in both the regular and underground sectors, 
an increase in the marginal tax rate led to increased hours of work in the underground. 
  Lemieux et al. (1994) analyzed the effects of taxes on work in the underground 
sector using the same data set as Lacroix and Fortin (1992), but adopted a different 
underlying theoretical model.  Their descriptive analysis revealed that not only were 
participation rates inversely related to disposable income, but that labor earnings in the 
underground sector were concentrated among workers with low earnings in the regular 
sector.  In addition, a probit analysis of participation in the underground showed some 
evidence that marginal tax rates increased participation.  However, the authors also found 
that, among workers who supplied labor to both sectors, higher marginal tax rates were 
associated with lower hours of work in the underground.  Finally, their results indicated   3
that hours worked in the underground sector were quite responsive to changes in the 
gross wage in the regular sector.  They concluded that, for the average worker, who is 
unlikely to work in the underground sector, taxes do not significantly distort the 
allocation of hours of work from the regular to the underground sector.  They suggested, 
however, that the effects might be large for some groups, such as welfare recipients, who 
do work in the underground sector. 
  Overall, these results suggest that enforcement of child support orders may have 
an important effect on the extent to which low-income, non-custodial fathers participate 
in the underground economy--both because such fathers have low incomes and, thus, are 
more likely to work in the underground, and because they may face high marginal tax 
rates arising from the imposition of child support orders. 
  This paper utilizes data from the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study to 
examine the effect of marginal tax rates on unmarried fathers’ participation in the 
underground.  Similar to the data employed by Lacroix and Fortin (1992) and Lemieux et 
al. (1994), the Fragile Families study asks respondents specifically about work and 
earnings in the underground sector.  In addition, an important obstacle to obtaining 
estimates of the effect of taxes on labor supply in the regular sector is the well-known 
fact that tax rates are endogenous (Triest 1998).  While the problem is lessened in the 
case of underground labor supply, it still exists (Lemieux et al. 1994).  However, an 
important advantage of the Fragile Families study is that it allows for estimation of the 
effects of taxes after taking into account exogenous state and local variation in income 
tax rates.       4
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we 
describe in greater detail the analysis of Lemieux et al. (1994) and Lacroix and Fortin 
(1992).  In section II we describe the data and method of analysis.  Section III presents 
the results of the analysis, and section IV concludes with suggestions for future research.   
I.  PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
  Lacroix and Fortin (1992) estimate a model in which it is assumed that an 
individual’s regular sector income is taxed at the rate τ.  In addition, the individual may 
work in the underground sector in order to reduce his tax burden.  However, if he does so, 
he faces a fixed probability p of being detected, in which case he must pay a proportion φ 
> τ of his underground income.  Individuals are assumed to choose hours of work in the 
regular and/or underground sectors in order to maximize utility.  In doing so, they face 
wages w0 = W0(1- τ) and w1 in the regular and underground sectors, respectively; W0 is 
the gross regular sector wage and w1 is given by:  
   w1 = W1 with probability (1 – p)   
               W1(1 - φ) with probability p 
where W1 is the gross wage in the underground sector. 
  In the solution to the model, individuals fall into one of four different regimes:  1) 
regular and underground employment; 2) regular employment only; 3) underground 
employment only; and 4) employment in neither sector.
2  The model yields labor supply 
functions for each regime, the parameters of which the authors estimate through 
maximum likelihood.  The finding of greatest relevance to this paper is that higher tax 
rates increase underground hours, but only among those workers employed in both the 
                                                           
2 Lacroix and Fortin also consider an extension to this model in which individuals’ hours in the regular 
sector can be constrained; in this case individuals can fall into one of six regimes.   5
underground and regular sectors.  In addition, the point estimate of the elasticity of 
underground hours with respect to the tax rate is reported by Lacroix and Fortin to be 
within the range estimated by Fortin et al. (1990), who estimate a model similar to the 
one later estimated by Lemieux et al. (1994).    
  Lemieux et al. (1994) develop a somewhat different model of underground labor 
supply.  Based on the relationships between regular and underground earnings and hours 
uncovered in the data, they model underground earnings as a concave Cobb-Douglas 
function of underground hours, and regular earnings as a linear function of regular 
hours.
3  Also, unlike the model developed by Lacroix and Fortin (1992), their model 
implicitly assumes that hours of work in the regular and underground sectors are perfect 
substitutes.   
  The model yields the following equations for underground hours as a function of 
the regular wage and the tax rate, and underground earnings as a function of underground 
hours: 
 ln(h1i) = (1/1 - θ) [ln θ + β0 + a0]  -  (1/1 - θ) ln(W0i)  -  (1/1 - θ) (1 – a1)ln(1 - τi) 
                            +  (1/1 - θ)x’1iβ1  +  (1/1 - θ)ε1i                 (1) 
 ln(Y1i) = β0  +  θ ln(h1i)  +  x’1iβ1  +  ε1 i               (2) 
where h1 = hours of work in the underground, x1i is a vector of explanatory variables, and 
Y1 = earnings in the underground.  In the earnings equation, the parameter θ determines 
the elasticity of underground earnings with respect to underground hours.  In addition, 
this parameter also determines the elasticity of underground hours with respect to the 
                                                           
3 Examination of the data revealed that the coefficient on regular hours in a regression of regular earnings 
was not statistically different from one.  Also, the coefficient on underground hours in a regression of 
underground earnings was significantly smaller than one.  Hence, the authors conclude that regular   6
regular wage, which is calculated as –1/(1 -  θ).  As a result, this parameter can be 
estimated directly by fitting the underground earnings equation, or indirectly by fitting 
the underground hours equation. 
  Lemieux et al. extend the model by assuming that underground workers face a 
probability p of being detected by the authorities and a penalty rate λ on evaded tax (with 
λ ≥ 1).  Incorporating these assumptions results in the following first-order condition with 
respect to the effect of the tax rate on underground hours of work: 
 dh1/dτ  =  h1(1 - pλ)/(1 - τ)(1 - pλ)(1 - θ) >  0    (3) 
Thus, under the condition that pλ < 1, the model predicts a negative effect of the marginal 
tax rate on underground hours of work. 
  In their empirical analysis, Lemieux et al. first estimate probit models for the 
likelihood of participation in the underground.  The primary independent variables in 
these models are the log of the gross wage and the marginal tax rate, entered as –log(1 - 
τ), where τ is the marginal tax rate associated with federal and provincial payroll and 
income taxes, as well as tax-back rates embodied in the social-transfer system.  
Additional variables included are age and its square, sex, labor market experience and its 
square, education, nonlabor income, and marital status.  In addition, some specifications 
also include either industry of employment dummies or a measure of excess employment 
in an individual’s industry.
4  Both simple and two-stage probit models are estimated.  In 
the latter models, the wage is instrumented with the industry dummies and union status, 
while the tax rate is instrumented with a predicted tax rate.  However, because the data 
                                                                                                                                                                             
earnings are a linear function of regular hours, while underground earnings are a concave function of 
underground hours.   7
employed by the authors is drawn from a single city, they cannot exploit exogenous 
variation due to provincial and/or local differences in tax rates.     
  In the simple probit models, the gross wage has a statistically significant negative 
effect on the likelihood of underground participation, while the marginal tax rate has a 
statistically significant positive effect.  In the two-stage probit models the magnitudes of 
the coefficients on the regular wage and the marginal tax rate increase.  However, the 
estimated standard errors increase by even more, so that the estimated coefficients are no 
longer statistically significant.  As a result, Hausman specification tests do not reject the 
simple probit specifications. 
  Lemieux et al. also estimate OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions 
of underground hours and underground earnings for the sample of workers employed in 
both the regular and underground sectors.  The estimated equations are corrected for 
sample selection bias through the inclusion of the inverse Mills’ ratio constructed from 
the probit equation for underground participation.  In the 2SLS models, the regular wage 
is instrumented with the industry dummies and union status, while the tax rate is 
instrumented with a predicted tax rate.  In the OLS results the coefficient on the tax rate 
is unexpectedly negative but statistically insignificant.  However, it is negative and 
significant in one of two specifications for the 2SLS equation.
5  In addition, the elasticity 
of underground hours with respect to the regular wage is negative and statistically 
significant in the OLS, but not the 2SLS, regressions.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 The excess employment variable was not statistically significant in any of the models.  In addition, the 
coefficients on the industry dummies were not reported.  However, the authors did report that none of the 
estimated coefficients changed substantially when the industry dummies were included. 
5 In this specification, the regular wage is instrumented with industry dummies only.  In the second 
specification, it is instrumented with both industry dummies and union status.  In this case the coefficient 
on the tax rate is reduced somewhat and becomes statistically insignificant.   8
  The authors present a final set of estimates in which the underground hours and 
earnings equations were fitted jointly.  Similar to the 2SLS estimates of the hours 
equation, the results indicate a negative and statistically significant effect of the tax rate 
on underground hours.   
  In sum, Lemieux et al. find some evidence that the marginal tax rate increases the 
likelihood of participation in the underground.  In contrast, they also find that the tax rate 
decreases hours of work in the underground among those workers who work in both 
sectors.  Finally, they find a large elasticity of underground hours with respect to the 
gross regular sector wage. 
II.  METHODS 
A.  Data 
 
  The evidence presented in this paper is based on data from the Fragile Families 
and Child Wellbeing Study (hereafter referred to as FF).
6  This study is collecting data on 
approximately 4,700 births (3,600 nonmarital, 1,100 marital) in 75 hospitals in 20 U.S. 
cities.
7  The data is representative of non-marital births in each of the 20 cities, and is also 
representative of non-marital births in U.S. cities with populations over 200,000.  At 
baseline, mothers were interviewed in the hospital within 24 hours after they had given 
birth.  Fathers were interviewed either at the hospital or outside the hospital as soon as 
                                                           
6 The Fragile Families Study has been designed and pretested by the principal investigators, Sara 
McLanahan of Princeton University and Irwin Garkinkel of Columbia University.  Jeanne Brooks-Gunn 
(Columbia University) and Marta Tienda (Princeton University) are co-investigators, along with a network 
of junior scholars including Lauren Rich (University of Pennsylvania), Sheila Ards (Benedict College), 
Waldo Johnson (University of Chicago), Mark Turner (Urban Institute), Maureen Waller (Public Policy 
Institute of California), and Melvin Wilson (University of Virginia). 
7The cities are:  Austin, Texas; Baltimore, Maryland; Birmingham, Alabama; Boston, Massachusetts; 
Chicago, Illinois; Corpus Christi, Texas; Detroit, Michigan; Indianapolis, Indiana; Jacksonville, Florida; 
Nashville, Tennessee; New York City; Newark, New Jersey; Oakland, California; Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Richmond, Virginia; San Antonio, Texas; Santa Ana, California; 
Toledo, Ohio; and Virginia Beach/Norfolk, Virginia.   9
possible after the birth.  Using this approach, the FF study has been able to interview 75% 
of the partners of the unmarried mothers.
8   
  This paper is based on the first wave of data collected in the twenty cities.  Data 
for the cities of Austin and Oakland were collected in the spring of 1998.  Data for the 
cities of Baltimore, Detroit, Newark, Philadelphia and Richmond were collected in the 
fall of 1999.  Data for the remaining cities were collected in the fall of 2000. 
  FF is unique in that it asks fathers (and mothers) specifically about informal 
economic activity, and any earnings arising from such activity.
9  At baseline, fathers were 
asked the following question: “We are interested in finding out about some ways, other 
than regular work, in which people make a living. Please indicate whether, in the last 
twelve months, you engaged in any of the following activities in order to generate income 
or in exchange for meals, clothing, a place to live, or other basic necessities: a) Off-the-
books or under-the-table work, such as household maintenance/repairs, providing 
transportation or other personal services, or selling personal property, b) Work in your 
own business (excluding activity already reported in a)), c) Selling stolen goods, selling 
or delivering drugs, or other hustles, or d) other.”  Finally, respondents who indicated 
they engaged in any of these activities were asked to report the number of weeks in the 
past twelve months they engaged in the activity, the number of hours per week they spent 
on the activity, and the amount they earned from each activity. 
  For comparison, the study employed by Lemieux et al. (1994) asks respondents to 
identify those jobs for which they report the proceeds in their income tax statements.  
Then, underground jobs are characterized as jobs from which the proceeds are not 
                                                           
8 For additional details on the sample and study design see Reichman et al. (2001).   10
reported.  Although the questions used to determine underground activity differ between 
the surveys, it is expected that there is a significant amount of overlap in the activities 
characterized as underground activities.  For example, it is probably unlikely that 
individuals engaging in off-the-books work (76% of the fathers in FF who report 
underground work report this activity) report the income from such work in their income 
tax statements.  Still, it is possible that some of the work reported as underground work in 
the FF study is work that would not be reported in the QC study. 
B.  Analysis 
 
  In this paper, we base our analysis on the theoretical model developed by 
Lemieux et al. (1994).
10  Because there have been so few analyses of microdata on 
underground employment, we first compare the sociodemographic characteristics of and 
extent of underground employment among the respondents in the Fragile Families (FF) 
and Quebec City (QC) data.
11  We then replicate the exploratory analysis of Lemieux et 
al. in order to determine whether the FF data exhibit the same “empirical regularities” as 
those found in the QC data (see footnote #3).   
  Next, we estimate probit models of participation in the underground.  Initially, we 
employ the specification adopted by Lemieux et al.
12  For this specification, we calculate 
each father’s federal marginal tax rate according to the earnings he reports in the FF 
survey.  We assume that each father files as a single individual and takes the standard 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 Mothers are not questioned about their own informal economic activity until round two of the survey.  
Hence, women are not included in the analysis in this paper. 
10 In future analyses, we will employ the Fragile Families data to estimate the model proposed by Lacroix 
and Fortin. 
11 We restrict the sample to unmarried fathers.  However, results including the married fathers are 
qualitatively similar to those presented in the paper. 
12 Our specification does not include a variable for excess employment in an individual’s industry.  In 
addition, due to data limitations, we control for occupation instead of industry.   11
deduction for an individual.  We also assume that fathers claim zero dependents.
13  Then, 
we extend the analysis of Lemieux et al. by including state and city taxes in the 
calculation of the overall marginal tax rate.  We do this in order to take advantage of 
exogenous variation across states and locales in tax rates.  In addition, we estimate a 
specification in which we include demographic and individual characteristic variables 
found in previous work to be important determinants of participation in the underground 
(Rich, 2001).   
  Finally, we estimate Lemieux et al.’s equations for underground hours and 
earnings.  For these equations we begin with the marginal federal tax rate as the primary 
independent variable, and then investigate the effect of taxes when state and city tax rates 
are included.  We also estimate specifications in which we control for sample selection 
bias through inclusion of the inverse Mills’ ratio calculated from the probit analysis of 
participation in the underground.  
III.  RESULTS 
A.  Comparison of FF and QC Samples 
 
  Table 1 compares the demographic characteristics of, as well as the extent of 
underground employment among, the respondents in the FF and QC surveys.   
  As noted previously, the FF sample in this analysis consists entirely of men, while 
the QC sample is split evenly between men and women.  Compared to the men in the QC 
study, a much higher proportion of the men in the FF sample reported participating in the 
underground sector (33.6 versus 9.9 percent).  In addition, among those men who 
reported participating in the underground, hours worked in this sector were 40 percent 
                                                           
13 A small percentage of the fathers report children living in their household.  Thus, our calculation may 
overstate the marginal tax rate for these fathers.   12
higher on average in the FF sample.  There was not a substantial difference between the 
underground participation rates of the men and women in the QC sample (9.9 versus 7.1 
percent). 
  The samples also differ on other dimensions.  Specifically, the respondents in the 
FF sample are more likely to be aged 18-24, less likely to be over the age of 40, more 
likely to be single, cohabiting, or in an “other” living arrangement, less likely to have 
more than a high school education, more likely to be either employed or unemployed, 
less likely to be enrolled or otherwise out of the labor force, more likely to be receiving 
social assistance, more likely to have worked 2,000 or more hours in the past year, and 
less likely to have worked zero hours.
14  In addition, respondents in the FF sample are 
more likely to have an annual income between 16,000 and 33,000, and less likely to have 
an income between 33,000 and 66,000.
15 
  However, the differences in demographic characteristics between the two samples 
do not appear to account for much of the difference in the observed underground 
participation rates.  Respondents in the QC sample who are younger, unmarried, in school 
or unemployed, receiving public assistance, or working between 1-500 annual hours are 
significantly more likely to participate in the underground.  In particular, QC respondents 
who are receiving public assistance, attending school, or unemployed, report 
underground participation rates similar to the average rate for the FF sample.  This 
suggests that, if respondents in the FF sample are more likely to fall into these categories 
(and if a similar relationship exists between these characteristics and underground 
                                                           
14 For the FF sample, the 18-24 category includes 40 respondents under the age of 18.  The majority of the 
FF respondents in the single/cohabiting/other category are cohabiting with a female partner, usually the 
mother of the focal child in the study.   13
participation), the demographic differences between the samples might explain a portion 
of the higher underground participation rate.   
  Individuals in the FF sample are more likely to be unemployed, and the 
underground participation rate is higher than average for this group.  However, while the 
underground participation rate is higher than average among students in both samples, FF 
respondents are much less likely than QC respondents to be enrolled.  Also, while the FF 
sample is younger and more likely to receive public assistance, underground participation 
rates do not vary much by age or assistance receipt in this sample.  On the other hand, 
underground participation rates in the FF study do vary somewhat according to marital 
status; 23.7 percent of married FF fathers reported participating in the underground, 
versus 33.6 percent of all unmarried FF fathers.  However, the participation rate for 
married men in the FF sample is significantly higher than the rate for married individuals 
in the QC sample.   Finally, while the participation rate is higher than average for FF 
individuals working 1-500 hours in the regular sector, FF respondents are about as likely 
as QC respondents to fall into this category. 
  As noted previously, the differences between the questions used to identify 
underground employment in the two surveys may also account for some of the difference 
in the proportions reported to participate in the underground.  In the QC study only jobs 
that are not reported in the individual’s income tax statement are recorded as 
underground employment.  In contrast, the FF study asks specifically about underground 
employment but does not attempt to ascertain whether the proceeds from such 
employment are reported as income.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 In the Lemieux et al. (1994) study the income categories were 0-10,000, 10,000-20,000, 20,000-30,000, 
30,000-40,000,and over 40,000 (in 1986 Canadian dollars).  The beginning and end points for these   14
  Table 2 shows the correlations of log hours, log wages, and log earnings in both 
sectors.  Similar to Lemieux et al., we found a positive correlation between hours and 
wages in the regular sector, and a negative correlation between hours and wages in the 
underground sector.  The degree of correlation between underground hours and wages in 
the FF data is significantly higher than that in the QC data, perhaps reflecting the fact that 
the underground wage for the FF sample was constructed using annual hours and annual 
earnings in the underground.  Also, unlike the QC data, where underground hours and the 
regular wage were negatively correlated, the correlation between underground hours and 
the regular wage in the FF data is somewhat positive.
16    
  In Table 3A we regress regular and underground hours on wages in the two 
sectors.  The equations also include age, age squared and education as regressors.  The 
results of these regressions confirm that the regular sector wage is positively related to 
hours in both sectors.  This conclusion is strengthened when the regular wage is 
instrumented with annual earnings divided by annual hours. 
  In Table 3B we report OLS regressions of regular sector earnings on regular 
hours, and of underground earnings on underground hours.  In both sectors, the elasticity 
of earnings with respect to hours is significantly smaller than one.  Thus, similar to the 
results reported by Lemieux et al, we find that earnings in the underground sector are a 
concave function of underground hours, suggesting that wages in the underground sector 
decrease as hours increase.  However, in contrast to the results reported by Lemieux et al, 
we also find that regular sector earnings are a concave function of regular sector hours.       
B.  Probit Analysis of Participation in the Underground 
                                                                                                                                                                             
categories were converted to 1999 U.S. dollars.   15
  Table 4 presents probit estimates of the decision to participate in the underground 
sector.  The specification in this table is similar to that employed by Lemieux et al, except 
that the models do not include a measure of excess employment in the individual’s 
industry.   
  In contrast to the results obtained by Lemieux et al., neither the regular wage nor 
the marginal tax rate has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of fathers’ 
participation in the underground sector.  In addition, none of the other variables in the 
model attain statistical significance.  In column 2, the effect of occupation is found to be 
statistically significant.  Specifically, individuals employed in sales, clerical, machinery, 
transportation, labor, and service occupations are significantly less likely than those 
employed in craft or repair occupations to participate in the underground.   
  Table 5 presents additional probit estimates of the decision to participate in the 
underground sector.  In column 1, based on previous analyses of the determinants of 
participation in the underground, the square of age and experience are excluded from the 
model.  In column 2, state taxes are included in the calculation of the marginal tax rate 
faced by individuals.  In column 3, city taxes are included in the calculation.  Finally, the 
model in column 4 includes additional demographic and individual characteristic 
variables found in previous work to be related to the decision to participate in the 
underground. 
  The results in column 1 indicate that the federal marginal tax rate has a negative 
but statistically insignificant effect on the likelihood of fathers’ participation in the 
underground.  The same is true of the regular wage.  The only variable with a statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 The correlations between underground hours and regular hours and earnings are not estimated with much 
precision.   16
significant effect in this model is age, the coefficient of which indicates that older fathers 
are less likely to participate in the underground sector.  In addition, although not shown, 
the occupational dummies continue to be statistically significant and to follow the pattern 
shown in Table 4. 
  When state taxes are used to compute the marginal tax rate the effect of the tax 
rate is measured more precisely.  However, the coefficient on the tax rate becomes 
somewhat less negative and the effect of this variable remains statistically insignificant.  
In column 3, when city taxes are added to the computation of the marginal tax rate, the 
estimated standard error of the tax variable falls further still, and the estimated coefficient 
becomes more negative.  As a result, the effect of the marginal tax rate becomes 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
  However, the inclusion of additional variables in the model (column 4) reduces 
the tax coefficient somewhat, and the effect again becomes statistically insignificant.  All 
of the additional included variables are statistically significant.  They indicate that the 
likelihood that unmarried fathers participate in the underground increases with the 
number of children and the amount of reported alcohol and drug use.  In addition, fathers 
born in the U.S. are more likely than those born outside of the U.S. to participate in the 
underground are, and blacks are less likely than fathers of other race/ethnicity groups to 
participate are.  
  In sum, there is some evidence that, in contrast to the results obtained by Lemieux 
et al., higher marginal tax rates reduce rather than increase the likelihood of participation 
in the underground sector.  However, this effect disappears when demographic and   17
individual characteristic variables not considered by Lemieux et al. are included in the 
regression model.  
C.  Estimates of the Underground Hours and Earnings Equations 
  Columns one through four of Table 6 present estimates of the underground hours 
equation (1) derived by Lemieux et al.  In column 1, the marginal tax rate is calculated 
based on federal taxes only.  In column 2, exogenous variation in state taxes is taken into 
account, while in column 3 city taxes are included.  The model in column 4 includes the 
additional demographic and individual characteristic variables found to be significant in 
the analysis of participation in the underground.  Initially, these equations were corrected 
for selectivity bias through the inclusion of the inverse Mills’ ratio constructed from the 
probit equation for underground participation.  However, because the coefficient on the 
Mills’ ratio was statistically insignificant, only the uncorrected results are presented 
here.
17  
  The effect of the federal marginal tax rate on underground hours is found to be 
negative but statistically insignificant.  Taking exogenous variation in state and city taxes 
into account causes the effect of the tax rate to become less negative.  In addition, the 
effect is measured with greater precision.  However, it remains statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  Thus, within the context of the model developed by 
Lemieux et al., this results leads to the unlikely conclusion that pλ = 1.   
  Also in contrast to the results obtained by Lemieux et al., the effect of the regular 
wage on underground hours is positive and significant in three of the four specifications 
of the model.  However, the implied elasticity of hours with respect to the wage obtained 
from the earnings regression  is –1.5 (i.e. –1/(1 - θ) = -1/(1 - .343)).  A Wald test rejects   18
the null hypothesis that this estimate is equal to the direct estimate of the elasticity 
obtained from the hours equation.  A Wald test also rejects the hypothesis that the value 
of θ implied by the elasticity estimate in the hours equation is equal to the estimate of θ 
in the earnings equation.  Thus, the data does not support the estimation of a unique θ 
through the joint fitting of the underground hours and earnings equations. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  Overall, we do not find any evidence that higher marginal tax rates encourage 
unmarried fathers’ participation in the underground.  On the contrary, we find some 
evidence that higher tax rates decrease participation.  However, once we control for other 
factors related to participation in the underground, the statistically significant negative 
effect of taxes disappears.  In addition, in a regression analysis of earnings among 
workers employed in the regular and underground sectors, we find that the coefficient on 
the marginal tax rate is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Employing the 
theoretical model developed by Lemieux et al., this result implies that the product of the 
probability of detection by the authorities and the penalty rate on evaded tax is equal to 
one.   
  In light of these findings, future empirical work on underground labor supply 
should seek to clarify the likely size of the probability that underground workers are 
detected by the authorities, as well as the penalty rate on evaded tax.  Clarification of the 
size of these parameters will yield additional information useful in assessing the 
applicability of the Lemieux et al. model.  In addition, as additional microdata on 
underground employment becomes available, further tests of the model proposed by 
Lemieux et al. might be conducted.  Finally, existing microdata such as the Fragile 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 The results of the selectivity-corrected equations are available from the authors.   19
Families study might be used to explore the applicability of other models of underground 
labor supply.     20
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 Table 1.  Comparison of Fragile Families and Quebec City data:  Proportion Participating in Underground and 
Hours/Earnings of Underground Participants, by Demographic Characteristics 
Fragile Families Sample 
(Unmarried Fathers) 
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Table 1.  Comparison of Fragile Families and Quebec City data:  Proportion Participating in Underground and 
Hours/Earnings of Underground Participants, by Demographic Characteristics (continued) 
Fragile Families Sample 
(Unmarried Fathers) 
 
Quebec City Sample 
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Table 2.  Correlation Matrix for Wages, Earnings and Hours Worked for Workers 
Holding Jobs in Both Sectors (p values in parentheses) 
Regular Sector  Underground Sector   
Variable  Hours Wage  Earnings  Hours Wage  Earnings 
Regular  hours  1.000       
Regular wage   0.237 
(0.000) 
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Table 3.  Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates of Hours 
and Earnings Equations for Workers Holding Jobs in Both Sectors 
A.  Hours Equations 
  Regular Sector  Underground Sector 
Independent  Variable  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
      








2.  Underground sector 






3.  Regular sector wage 
 
     Underground sector   















      
B.  Earnings Equations      
      
Regular sector hours  0.620*** 
(0.045) 
--- --- --- 
Underground sector hours  ---  ---  0.443*** 
(0.024) 
 
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05 
Note:  Regressions also include age, age squared and education.   5
Table 4.  Model of Participation in the Underground Sector 
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(0.076) 
--- 








Marginal tax rate 
















































    
Log-likelihood -1,363.7  -1,350.5 
N 2,145  2,145 
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05   6
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Marginal tax rate 
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Number  of  Children  --- --- ---  0.049* 
(0.023) 
Born in U.S.  ---  ---  ---  0.472*** 
(0.093) 
   7













  Never 
  < once a month 
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Log-likelihood  -1,350.8 -1,350.7 -1,349.7 -1,303.4 
N  2,145 2,145 2,145 2,145 
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05 
Note:  All specifications include occupational dummies. 
    8
Table 6.  Equations for Hours of Work and Earnings in the Underground Sector 
Hours Earnings  Independent 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2 
Underground 
Hours 
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(0.201) 
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(0.201) 
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(0.207) 










































--- --- --- --- --- 
Marginal tax 
rate (fed + state) 
--- -1.114 
(0.784) 
--- --- --- --- 
Marginal tax 
rate (fed + state 
+ city) 
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Table 6.  Equations for Hours of Work and Earnings in the Underground Sector (continued) 
Hours Earnings  Independent 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2 
Drug use: 
  Never 
  < once a month 
 
  Several 
times/month 
  Several 
times/week 





























































        
R
2  0.017 0.016 0.015 0.046 0.322 0.333 
Adjusted R
2  0.007 0.006 0.005 0.017 0.316 0.313 
N  592 592 592 592 592 592 
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05 